University of Nebraska - Lincoln

DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln
Great Plains Quarterly

Great Plains Studies, Center for

2006

Relief for Wanderers: The Transient Service in Kansas, 1933-35
Peter Fearon
University of Leicester

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly
Part of the Other International and Area Studies Commons

Fearon, Peter, "Relief for Wanderers: The Transient Service in Kansas, 1933-35" (2006). Great Plains
Quarterly. 62.
https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/greatplainsquarterly/62

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Great Plains Studies, Center for at
DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been accepted for inclusion in Great Plains Quarterly by an
authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.

Published in GREAT PLAINS QUARTERLY 26:4 (Fall 2006). Copyright © 2006 Center for Great Plains Studies, University of Nebraska–Lincoln.

RELIEF FOR WANDERERS
THE TRANSIENT SERVICE IN KANSAS,

1933~35

PETER FEARON

Located at the crossroads of America, Kansas
had long experience of interstate migrants. For
many decades armies of workers had entered
the state to pursue the harvest of a number of
crops, or to pick up whatever work was available
on their way west in pursuit of a more rewarding life. The u.s. population was highly mobile
and migration played an essential role in a
vigorously expanding economy. Ailing transients, especially tubercular cases, had as their
destination the pure, dry air of the Southwest.

To these we can add indeterminate numbers of
seasonal workers, ex-veterans, homeless boys,
peddlers, beggars, and rootless individuals,
some of who had recently been discharged from
prisons or from other institutions.
People on the move usually traveled by
horse-drawn prairie schooner, by rail, or made
their way by hitchhiking. In the 1920s lowpriced used autos enabled many families to
travel with relative ease over considerable distances'! Migrants, however, were often unprepared for the rigors of their journey, and they
inevitably presented a local welfare problem
when their resources were totally exhausted
and they were forced to seek public relief.2
Before the New Deal made federal funding
available, poor relief in the United States was
firmly based on the principle of local delegation, and in most states responsibility for assisting the poor was delegated to the county in
which they had legal settlement. 3 For example,
in Kansas, legal settlement was gained by residence in a county for a minimum of six months,
but it was lost if there was a deliberate absence
of six months or if settlement was gained elsewhere. Local responsibility was considered an
important means of targeting relief to those
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who deserved it and of safeguarding against
excessive expenditure. 4 Nonresident destitutes
who were forced to ask for assistance got little
help from Kansas counties, which, before 1929,
allocated less than 1 percent of their annual
relief expenditures to supplicants who had no
legal settlement. 5 Spurned by county officials,
migrants often had to rely on private charities for emergency assistance to avoid extreme
hardship.
Even before the Great Depression began
to squeeze the national economy, the scale of
interstate migration was significant. A survey
of sixty-three Kansas cities, undertaken in
1929 by the League of Kansas Municipalities
in cooperation with the Kansas Conference of
Social Work, reported 6,949 transient cases.
These cases included nearly two thousand
families who traveled with approximately
four thousand children whose education was
severely disrupted and whose health was at risk.
In addition, 13,437 single men and 1,388 single
women were assisted. The figures seriously
underestimated the total, as only one prison
was included in this survey, yet city and county
jails played a very important role in providing
shelter for single migrants. 6
Once the national economy went into
a steep decline, the numbers of transients
rose but no systematic attempt was made to
record their numbers across the state. Pockets
of information, usually from centers where
trained social workers were trying to cope with
the situation, provide evidence of a mounting
welfare problem that was replicated throughout
the nation. For example, during the winter of
1931-32, the shelter maintained by the Topeka
Provident Association was filled each night to
its capacity of twenty-two. When the temperature dropped to levels that created a danger
to rough sleepers, the local prison housed an
additional forty. For the calendar year 1931, the
Provident Association provided 13,142 meals
and 4,373 beds, a big increase when compared
with 7,222 meals and 1,826 beds that had been
needed during the previous year.
Throughout the state it was increasingly
evident that welfare provision for residents

was grossly inadequate and that the additional
problem posed by migrants was becoming more
acuteJ Evidence of this mounting welfare crisis
was provided by the Family Welfare Society
in Wichita, which could only offer shelter to
between ten and seventeen homeless people
each night during the severe winter weather
of 1930-31. There were very few dedicated
shelters for the homeless; for those who could
not find a place in dorms run by charities or
in boiler rooms or grain elevators, the usual
escape from the weather was the local jail.
Homeless unemployed men and boys found on
the streets by the police were often "vagged,"
that is, arrested, kept overnight in the cells, and
then sent on their way next morning without
charge. In December 1930, police in Wichita
arrested 450 persons for vagrancy but virtually
all of them were released without charge after a
night in jail with an injunction to leave town.
During the winter of 1931-32 the police rescued
similar numbers. 8 Prison accommodation was
overcrowded, uncomfortable, and unhygienic
but preferable to spending a night on the street
in subzero temperatures. However, although
newspapers and a cardboard box were the
summer choice of many rough sleepers, that
was not true for all. Over 650 migrants spent
the night in Wichita's jail during June 1931, the
overwhelming majority having been arrested
for vagrancy.
All Kansas residents were aware of the growing strain that the depression was imposing
on their county's relief budget, and the overwhelming majority of taxpayers believed that
charity begins and ends at home. Strangers
were often regarded contemptuously as "bums"
or "scroungers" if they asked for assistance;
however, if they sought work they were accused
of stealing scarce jobs from locals who should
always have priority.9 This prejudice was
widespread, even though in 1930 45 percent
of the residents of Kansas cities and 27 percent of the state's farmers had migrated from
another state.I° According to contemporary
sociologist Robert S. Wilson, counties dealt
with interstate migrants in a variety of ways.
The majority of them favored "Passing On,"
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where in an emergency transients were given
a small allocation of gas and a little food but
no offer of accommodation; recipients were
then urged to leave for somewhere, indeed
anywhere, else. "Threatening On" involved a
more aggressive approach, usually on the part
of the police. Transients were threatened with
imprisonment or some other assault on their
civil liberties if they did not leave town immediately. "Indiscriminate Haphazard Relief" was
kindly meant but fundamentally unwise. Retail
stores and private individuals gave handouts to
all the seemingly needy that called, and private
charities gave assistance without coordinating
their activities or engaging in any social investigation of applicants.!! Skilful mendicants
were able to exploit the system and inform the
likeminded of the easy pickings available.
There were few examples of a fourth
approach, "Constructive Assistance and
Centralized Responsibility." Only the family
welfare societies in Wichita, Topeka, and
Kansas City, Kansas, together with the Red
Cross agencies at McPherson, Dodge City,
Independence, Parsons, and Atchison, employed
the full-time trained social workers that could
provide the professional welfare service that
transients required. In these centers, social
workers attempted, through a series of interviews, to construct a plan that would either
return the transients to their place of origin
or help them move on to a suitable destination.1 2 These isolated examples of excellent
practice were crucial in framing the plan that
Kansas submitted to the Federal Emergency
Relief Administration (FERA) to secure funding for the establishment of a State Transient
Service.
Unemployment, inadequate relief, the catastrophic fall in farm prices, drought, and the
inability of marginal farm families to secure the
part-time work that was necessary to prevent
utter destitution were the key factors pushing
migrationP The prospect of a job in a distant
place, or the security of being close to relatives, were significant elements pulling travelers toward a new life.1 4 It was inevitable that
some would have to beg for assistance while

247

on the road or when they reached their final
destinations but were not entitled to resident
relief. There was a clear need for a federal program that would offer assistance to vulnerable
travelers who had no legal claim to local assistance. This lifeline was provided by the FERA
through one of its special emergency relief
programs. The FERA was the key New Deal
relief agency during the period 1933-35 and it
was responsible for distributing over $3.0 billion in grants to the states to assist the needy.
This sum represented approximately 70 percent
of the entire expenditure on emergency relief
during these years.!S
Because of this New Deal initiative, for the
first time in U.S. history federal grants became
available for the relief of needy people who
had no legal residence in anyone state or community.!6 A Transient Division was created
within the FER A in order to establish a nationwide program to assist transients, defined as
persons who had resided for less than twelve
consecutive months in the state where they
applied for reliefP In order to secure funding,
all states were required to cooperate with the
federal government in the creation of a specially designed administrative structure that
would help stabilize the lives of needy migrants
who fell into this category. The provision of
public assistance for needy people on the move
who could not meet this minimum residence
requirement was a radical departure from
past practice and it was a farsighted and bold
experiment.
By analyzing the provision of aid to transients in Kansas, this article provides a fresh
insight into a neglected New Deal initiative.
Indeed, the transient program is ignored in
virtually all the texts used in university history
courses.!S The aims of the transient service, how
it operated, and how effective it was in meeting the demands placed upon its are significant
issues that can be effectively explored at the
state level. Other crucial questions include: Did
this initiative encourage interstate migration
rather than curtail it? How effective was the
transient program in identifying the causes of
transiency and resolving them? Were families
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and single migrants successfully stabilized, and
if so, how many fell into this category? Did
the work undertaken by transients, especially
those living in camps, adequately equip them
for private-sector employment? If the Transient
Service was effective, why was it terminated in
1935?
Kansas provides a particularly interesting political framework for a case study.
Between 1933 and 1936 the state had in Alf
Landon a Republican governor who, in 1936,
was Roosevelt's principal opponent in the
race for the White House. There was also a
Republican majority in the state legislature.
Kansas Republicans strove with all their might
to attract federal funds that accompanied the
key New Deal initiatives.t 9 However, not only
did the Republicans manage New Deal relief
policies in the "Sunflower State," they did
so remarkably effectively. During the period
in question, experienced federal field officers
frequently testified that Kansas had one of
the most efficient relief administrations in
the country.20 The testimony of federal field
officers has to be taken seriously. These agents
were highly experienced professionals who provided their Washington masters with a frank
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of
the relief administrations in the states where
they exercised responsibility.21 The praise
the Kansas relief administration attracted for
managing the FERA and the Civil Works
Administration (CWA) was clear and unambiguous. 22 An examination of the Transient
Service in Kansas provides a microcosm of best
practice that New Deal officials hoped to see in
every state.
ThE KANSAS TRANSIENT SERVICE

In July 1933 the FER A invited states to
register their plans for the establishment of
a transient service. Each plan had to provide
detailed information on the extent and the
nature of the problem that migrants posed,
indicate how these problems would be tackled,
and also give an estimate of the cost of the
proposals. The federal government indicated

that states should establish a central facility
for the registration of transients, where they
would immediately be assigned to a social
worker who would provide full casework facilities. Bona fide transients could expect food,
shelter, and clothing to be provided according
to their needs. They would also receive medical
attention. Transport would be available to take
them either to their place of legal residence
or to another location that would be decided
on after consultation with a social worker. It
was stressed that "passing on" was a thing of
the past. A return to a place of legal residence
would take place only with the cooperation
of the migrants and within the framework
of interstate agreements. There would be no
undue pressure on transients to return from
whence they came, as the care given to them
would not have a time limit. Finally, suitable
employment provided through local work
projects, or resulting from registration with
employment bureaus, was an essential part
of the plan. Seasonal migratory workers were
not considered transients, and nor were intrastate migrants or the state's homeless; all were
judged a local responsibility.23
Although the relationship between the
FERA and the states was a partnership, the
states were obliged to fulfill certain conditions
before they could claim their cash grants. For
example, each had to start collecting statistical information that could be transmitted to
Washington in the form requested. This data
eventually made possible the creation of an
accurate picture of the transient problem across
the nation, whereas previously, estimates of
the numbers of migrants had varied considerably and most were wildly inaccurate. 24 It also
provided the basis for several valuable and
innovative empirical studies on the causes and
the effects of transiency.25 The FERA had great
faith in the benefits of social casework, and
states were urged to transform wanderers into
clients. We can also note the New Deal horror
of dole payments, which, it was believed, would
lead to dependency.26 Where possible, those fit
for work were supposed to perform useful tasks
rather than luxuriate in idleness. Transients
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were excluded by law from employment in
the Public Works Administration (PWA) and
CWA programs, but officials hoped that transients would find sufficient work, or work relief,
locally. New Deal officials were in no doubt
that assistance for transients through a program
specifically dedicated to them was essential if
local prejudice was to be avoided. However,
they were also anxious to avoid the natural
resentment that would arise if migrants were
judged to be treated too favorably. The assessment of their need by trained social workers
was the means by which equality of treatment
could be assured.27 It was not anticipated that
distress-induced migration would be curtailed
solely by the activities of the Transient Service
but as a result of various New Deal programs,
some of which were designed to assist farmers,
others to generate more jobs through economic
recovery, and for the less fortunate, to provide
more generous relief to those who remained at
home.
There was little enthusiasm in Kansas about
extending care to transients, on the grounds
that the inevitable result would be even more
wanderers applying for assistance.2 s However,
the state relief administration, encouraged by
the prospect of federal funding, acted quickly.
Using as a guide the "Alabama Plan," one of
the few that had already been approved by the
FERA, the state's submission was dispatched
on September 7. 29 Within two weeks the
FERA had approved the plan and had agreed,
initially, to provide a monthly grant of fifteen
thousand dollars. A week later, Gerard F.
Price was appointed as state supervisor of the
Transient Division of the Kansas Emergency
Relief Committee (KERC).
Price first instituted a survey in order to
determine the number of transients, their location, and the facilities currently available for
their care and rehabilitation. The next step was
to establish the new administrative structure
that had been agreed with the FERA, which
required the creation of two types of service
centers and also camps that would form part
of a national network. Reference Centers were
established in each of the state's 105 counties
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under the direction of the poor commissioner,
who was made responsible for the direct supervision of resident cases. Reference Centers
became the first port of call for transients.
After registration, each migrant received
immediate but temporary care, which included
food and lodging, and had the opportunity to
meet a social worker. The next step was the
referral of families, single men, and boys to a
treatment center where the process of rehabilitation would begin. At the treatment center,
families and individuals received a medical
examination, accommodation was provided,
and work began on a plan that was intended to
bring their wandering to a halt. The rehabilitation of each client to the point of self-sufficient
stability was seen as an essential part of the
service offered by the Transient Division.
Reference Centers offered primary help at
the point of registration without requiring the
transients to travel immediately to a treatment
center. 30 Verification by the State Registration
Bureau that the family or individual qualified
as bona fide indigent interstate transients was
necessary before relief could be offered on other
than a temporary basis. Like all New Deal relief
programs, assistance to transients was means
tested. On the receipt of a clearing return
from the Registration Bureau, transients who
had a legal settlement elsewhere were urged to
return to their homes and offered assistance
with transport costs to make this option more
appealing. Or they would be given help to plan
their onward migration, which would involve
identifying the transient help available in
other states. If neither option was possible,
they, and those who had lost settlement, were
referred to a treatment center. Transport to
the center could be provided but only after an
agreed amount of work had been undertaken
to cover the cost. The information gathered
by the transient survey instituted by Gerard
Price was used to determine the location of
each treatment center, where care was organized while social workers and clients worked
together on a stabilization plan.
Separate treatment centers were established
for both families and single males, though
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single females and boys less than fourteen years
of age were accommodated in family centers.
The family centers were supervised by trained
social workers but the transient families were
lodged in houses in various parts of the towns
in which the centers were located. The laudable aim was to integrate transient families
with their neighbors and to avoid segregation
that would make transition to a stable life more
difficult. Unattached males, on the other hand,
were lodged in single buildings near places
where they might find work. Strenuous efforts
were made to find appropriate, continuous work
for all transients who were considered fit for
employment. The significance of regular work
in the path toward a normal life was stressed
by the FERA and was echoed by all Kansas
officials. Indeed, the FERA proposal was that
all able-bodied transients should perform thirty
hours of work each week in exchange for their
subsistence and a small cash allowance. 3! The
first family treatment center was opened in
Wichita on November 1, 1933, and others followed it in Kansas City and Topeka. Single
males benefited from the opening on November
22 of the Railroad YMCA building in Topeka,
a gift of the Santa Fe Railroad, and soon afterward, that of another center at Fort Scott.
The general principles and aspirations of
the Kansas Transient Division were clear.
There would be no more "passing on," nor
would there be a limitation to relief arbitrarily
imposed by untrained and unsympathetic officials anxious to appease local taxpayers. It was
now recognized that the key to successful work
with transients was stabilization, which could
mean a return to their place of legal settlement
or a move to a new location where the chances
of economic and social survival seemed good,
or if all else failed, care within the state of
Kansas. Stabilization, however, was not viewed
as an easy option; it was only possible if clients
gave their full cooperation and if they had the
assistance of skilled caseworkers. Kansas welfare professionals hoped that other states would
provide at least as high standards for the care of
their residents on relief as was made available
to travelers by the Kansas Transient Division so

that the incentive to take to the road could be
minimized. 32
At the close of 1934 there were nine treatment centers for unattached males, of which four
were work camps, located at the Wabaunsee,
Howard, Sedan, and Gardner Lake projects.
When the program ended in September 1935,
the three family treatment centers were part
of a sixteen-center operation, which included
a transient's hospital in Topeka. In January
1934, a total of 310 families and 3,737 unattached men and women were assisted by the
state Transient Service. These numbers swelled
to an annual peak in December of 1,436 families (of which 1,322 were assisted by the three
family treatment centers) and 11,523 unattached persons. During 1935 a monthly average
of 14,523 nonresidents were cared for. Monthly
figures show marked fluctuations because of the
influence of the weather, the onset of school
vacations, which influenced family travel,
and of course, the closure of the program in
September 1935. However, the number of
families assisted reached a 1935 peak of 2,475
in July, while the unattached, at 16,824, were at
their most numerous in March. 33 These figures,
and those collected nationally, understate the
number of transients because they are limited
to travelers who registered at centers. It is not
possible to calculate the numbers of migrants
who for various reasons refused to ask for assistance from the Transient Division.
By October 1934, all states with the exception of Vermont were participants in the
Federal Transient Program. One benefit of this
universal approach was that it introduced a
regular count of assisted transients through a
mid-monthly census, which allows the Kansas
experience to be put in perspective. The
national peak for transient families occurred
during February and March 1935 when just
over forty thousand were recorded. The count
of unattached individuals reached a high point
in December 1934 with 160,523, of whom 5,004
were women. The total cost of the transient
program to the taxpayer was $106.1 million
out of which Kansas secured $2.1 million. This
was a similar sum to that received by Colorado,
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nearly double the grant received by Oklahoma
and Nebraska but less than the $3.5 million
awarded to Missouri. 34 To put this in perspective, during 1934 Kansas transients were cared
for at an average cost of 18 cents per day and
during that year travelers received $91,906 in
cash wages while the value of their relief in
kind was assessed at $427,231,35
CARE FOR MIGRANT FAMILIES

The survey undertaken at the request of
Gerard Price in late 1933 had shown that the
provision of aid for all transients was poor, but
it was the lack of care offered to families that
posed the biggest welfare risk. These findings
persuaded officials that family care should be
a priority. The three family treatment centers
were, therefore, situated in the most urbanized
parts of the state, a logical outcome of the
decision to place transient families in private
houses where they could experience not only
the stabilizing influence of home life but could
also enter into community activities. Large
cities were the only places that combined a
sufficient number of homes to rent with the
opportunity for suitable work relief. Since the
Transient Service was able to pay relatively
high rents, the provision of suitable housing
was never a problem. 36 Social workers hoped
that the family treatment centers and the
county relief administrations could be amalgamated, but it was soon clear that this additional burden would be too much for county
organizations that were struggling to cope with
a big increase in resident cases. Transient relief,
therefore, remained a separate category, much
to the regret of officials who feared that this distinction would stigmatize nonresidents. 37 The
integration of transients and residents in their
communities was considered a priority by social
workers as they strove to stabilize the former and
it was unfortunate, although unavoidable, that
this crucial relationship was compromised by
the separation of relief organizations.
The treatment centers created the opportunity for caseworkers to embark upon a full
investigation of their clients. They also provided
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families with the opportunity to avail themselves of a range of medical services that few
had previously encountered. Most migrant
families came from Oklahoma, Texas, Missouri,
and Arkansas, where relief was neither as well
organized as it was in Kansas nor, according
to Kansas officials, as generous. In particular,
travelers should have been impressed by the
medical services available at the treatment
centers. A small medical unit was provided in
each center where sick cases could be isolated
and where acute illnesses such as pneumonia
could receive bedside nursing. During 1934,
7,380 people received medical attention at the
family treatment centers; of these, 2,339 were
vaccinated and 2,051 were immunized. All
transients were given typhoid jabs; those under
twelve years of age received diphtheria toxin.
Serious infectious diseases, for example tuberculosis or venereal disease, could be identified
and the sufferers offered treatment or isolation.
During 1934 alone, 386 syphilitics were diagnosed at the family treatment centers. 38 Dental
care had been sadly neglected but now large
numbers of people were able to enjoy relief
after years of suffering. The Transient Service
also provided dentures, although only to those
younger men who were best placed in the job
market, and they were given the opportunity
to work extra hours to· pay for the dental treatment they received. 39
The Transient Service was also obliged
to help the victims of a number of accident
cases. As neither the railroads nor the counties would accept responsibility for migrants
injured on their property, the cost of caring
for them fell on the Transient Service. A
small hospital was opened in Topeka in
January 1935 and was made available to transients throughout the state; during the twelve
months of its existence, it had an average daily
load of twenty-six patients. The medical assistance available for all categories of transients
and was not limited to accident cases. Highquality medical care was of great benefit to a
group in poor general health, few of whom had
been previously subject to systematic scrutiny
by doctors and nurses.
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Until October 1934, transient families
received relief only in kind. Family heads who
were able to work performed various assigned
tasks and in return had their utility bills and
rent paid, groceries issued to them at a grocery
store, and clothing purchased for their families.
Once it was clear to social workers that some
families wanted to stop wandering and remain
in one location, they supported the introduction of a system of cash relief. Willing and
able men were given work relief on exactly the
same budgetary deficiency basis used for FERA
resident cases in the counties. Family resources
and needs were assessed by social workers and
sufficient hours of work were allocated, up to a
maximum of thirty, so that at least part of the
deficiency gap could be bridged. To cut down on
administrative costs and to assist the rehabilitative process, clients who had the appropriate
skills were also used as clerks, stenographers,
or as janitors and general laborers. In fact, if
clients were suitably qualified for any particular
task they were given employment, though not
at the cost of them securing private jobs if any
became available. National and local officials
stressed the morale-boosting effects of employment in a wide variety of occupations and the
closer commitment to the program on the part
of transients that resulted from their participation in it. 40
Females who headed households were also
offered work, though the need to care for children often proved a major obstacle. If women
had no office skills they were employed as
cleaners or in sewing rooms set up for work
relief. In Topeka, the women's sewing room
used textile remnants to manufacture 2,030
toys while men made 310 dolls that were given
to the children of transients and to other
relief families for Christmas 1934.41 Sewingroom facilities enabled transient families to
make their own clothing and look neater and
more self-confident than was usual for relief
clients. Employment on work projects played
an important part in the rehabilitative process
and gave transients the opportunity to appreciate the demands and the limitation of family
budgeting. However, work relief was only given

to families who were physically and mentally
equipped to cope with the tasks and who
were also believed to have become stable. The
others continued to receive direct relief. 42
The oddities of the settlement laws were
irksome to social workers and puzzling to many
residents. A special session of the Kansas
Legislature held during October 1933 had made
the state's settlement laws more restrictive.
To be consistent with federal rules defining
transients, a continuous residence of twelve
months was required to gain settlement, but
it could be lost by an absence of six months.
In other words, native Kansans who had
been absent from their county of settlement
for over six months, and as a result had lost
settlement rights, had to demonstrate continuous residence of twelve months in their
new county in order to gain settlement. The
result was that for a six-month period some
mobile Kansans had no settlement rights in
any state. Normally families in this predicament continued to live in their new Kansas
county instead of being sent to a family treatment center. They remained there, still under
the care of the State Transient Service but
approved and budgeted for relief as if they
were residents, until they qualified for settlement. The general rule was that the counties
took care of all intrastate transients and the
federal centers were restricted to interstate
cases only.43 However, the flexibility in the
system was beneficial to Kansans without legal
settlement in their own state. These families
often had the support of relatives with whom
they sometimes lodged, or they had friends in
the community and there were better opportunities for employment. It made little sense
to temporarily place rural families in a big city
treatment center solely in order for them to
gain legal settlement prior to a return to the
countryside. 44 Care in the counties was both
a sensible and a cost-effective policy for those
falling afoul of the settlement laws. However,
where legal settlement outside Kansas could be
verified, and there was good reason to encourage families to return to their former homes,
this was done. During 1934 the three family
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treatment centers returned 652 families to their
legal settlements.45
TRANSIENT MEN

Unattached men posed different problems
to those generated by families. In contrast with
other FERA activities, an important feature
of the transient program was congregate and
camp care, which was seen as the only way
to deal with large numbers of homeless men,
and the vast majority of them were cared for
in this way.46 Several treatment centers for
single males were located at the stopping points
where the railroad routes, which carried about
90 percent of single transients, were most
likely to discharge their nonpaying passengers.
Centers at Topeka, Fort Scott, Hutchinson,
Dodge City, and Liberal owed much to the
popular practice of riding railcars. In mid-1934,
however, only the Rock Island Railroad had
failed to significantly curb free riders, and that
line then provided a relatively large numbers
of transients. 47 By the spring of 1935 railroad
travel had been so significantly reduced that
treatment centers in Belleville, Herrington,
and Liberal were closed down. 48 By the middle
of 1935, one-third of travelers were using the
highway.49 Auto dealers who wanted vehicles
delivered to distant destinations provided a
seemingly attractive and cheap means of travel
for some men to move west but unfortunately,
delivery drivers could be stranded on arrivapo
Every effort was made to avoid locating the
congregate treatment centers in the most unsavory urban environment where clients would
be exposed to temptations of the flesh and of
the bottle. However, while officials sought sites
they thought would boost the morale of their
clients and contribute to their stabilization
program, local people worried about the effect
of large numbers of homeless men on property
values and even on personal safety.51 Moreover,
the transients were also seen as competitors for
both private employment and for relief work.
State officials, however, were imaginative and
relatively successful in their attempts to pacify
local opposition. Public meetings were held
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so that plans could be discussed with local
residents at an early stage and the questions
they found most problematic were answered.
Sometimes a committee whose membership
included residents was formed to try to identify suitable premises for a treatment center. If
transients were to playa part in the community
and not become isolated, it was essential that
relationships with local people were cordial.
When centers opened, it was customary for
representatives of local civic groups and religious leaders to be invited for a meal. For a
small charge the standard institutional fare
was provided; attendance was usually very high
and reports indicate that the visitors were suitably impressed. Senior officials believed that
"housewarmings" and the general emphasis on
community relationships helped protect the
transient service from potentially destructive
criticism. 52
Staff at the centers were convinced that
the development of self-respect and confidence
on the part of each transient was an essential
prerequisite if a nomadic life was to be abandoned. The centers sought to inculcate new
attitudes by ensuring that every man had his
own bed rather than a canvas cot that would be
allocated to a different person each night, that
there was a high standard of cleanliness in the
building, and that decent food and adequate
washing facilities were also provided for clients.
Lockers were available for personal possessions,
and where possible, privacy was encouraged.
Some men entered the center dirty, verminous and dressed in rags; stabilization required
high levels of personal hygiene and adequate
clothing, which was provided for them. All the
sheets, pillowcases, and towels for the unattached men's centers and the camps were made
in the fully equipped sewing room set up in the
Topeka family treatment center.
It became obvious that the men actually
enjoyed working to improve the building they
occupied and that their spartan rooms could
be transformed in a short space of time if
the appropriate level of supervision and the
materials were provided. The men also benefited from a compulsory medical inspection
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for all those registered as transients and from
hospital services available at Topeka, Fort
Scott, Hutchinson, and the Gardner Center
and Wabaunsee camp, which treated a total
of 2,246 patients in 1934. 53 Many transients
had been victims of self-neglect and had a low
resistance to infectious disease. 54 These positive measures were designed to erase the worst
aspects of institutional life so that the process
of stabilization could begin with clients who
had a respect both for their center and for the
way in which it was run. The centers were not
flophouses, but nor were they missions. 55
After an initial interview with a caseworker,
during which the client's skills and fitness
for work were assessed, unattached men were
encouraged to search for jobs locally. Although
the labor market was depressed, they were
sometimes successful, especially during the
summer months when seasonal work became
more readily available. Work projects were also
set up for men who were fit for work but unable
to find private-sector employment. They were
employed on tasks such as construction, repair
and maintenance in the centers, the demolition of public buildings, landscaping, public
park improvements, and the maintenance and
repair of the national cemetery at Fort Scott.
The Topeka Board of Education employed
about forty transient men as assistant janitors;
others worked in the same capacity in the
City Building. Unfortunately, Topeka labor
union officers, who feared that relief workers
would displace salaried janitors from their jobs,
objected to this initiative so strongly that the
transients were removed. 56 The usual difficulty
for transients was that the public denounced
them as scroungers if they did no work but if
their search for public or private jobs was successful, they were accused of taking employment away from deserving locals. The fact that
transients were fed and housed only added to
the resentment felt by their rivals in the search
for scarce work.
Lake construction projects provided the
rationale for the four transient camps. The
Transient Service set up both Wabaunsee
and Gardner camps, and as many clients

had experience in the construction industry,
they were able to help with the erection of
camp buildings. 57 Workers registered at the
Topeka Treatment Center were transported
to Wabaunsee each day in order to build a
202-acre lake. The Gardner project involved
transient clients building, under supervision,
cabins, a water plant, and communal facilities and also fitting electrical wiring and gas
pipes. In September 1934, two mobile camps
were established at Howard and Sedan. Both
counties were desperately short of water and
had begun to construct two lakes but could
not recruit sufficient local relief labor to
complete the work in the time allowed by the
water conservation program. At the request
of the KERC, the Transient Service provided
an additional 100 men at Howard and 150 at
Sedan, though the work was organized so that
the local relief workers and the transients were
employed on separate parts of each project.
The rationale for this segregation is not clear,
though the implication is that it was for reasons of efficiency, not status. 58 By the end of
1934, both dams were close to completion.
All the centers and the camps developed
well-organized leisure programs that eventually gave transients similar facilities to those
available to the small-town dweller. During
the winter months, when outside activities
were curtailed, clients could use a recreation
room to write letters, read, or play games. Local
donations ensured that current newspapers
and magazines were available to them rather
than reading matter long out of date and close
to disintegration. The larger camps showed
movies and the more isolated camps opened
commissaries, the profits from which were
ploughed back into leisure activities, in one
case helping to finance the purchase of caps
and uniforms for baseball teams. 59 During the
warmer months outdoor activities were available. Basketball, softball, volleyball, and even
soccer teams competed in local community
leagues. Perhaps if the Transient Program had
continued for longer, the United States might
have emerged as a world force in soccer, a truly
international ballgame. A golf course was
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constructed at the Wabaunsee camp, which
became a popular leisure facility for inhabitants of the small town just a few miles distant.
By encouraging these activities, and by making
available the facilities of the camps to local
people on special occasions such as the Fourth
of July, the Transient Service and their clients
made considerable progress in building bridges
with their neighbors. In addition to games,
a handicraft program was implemented so
that old skills could be retained or new ones
acquired. Each center and camp had a fully
equipped workshop where clients were encouraged to produce small items for themselves.
Before long it was apparent that high-quality furniture could be produced, and by late
1934 over 80 percent of the office furniture of
the State Transient office, the KERC offices,
and those of other agencies had been made
by transients on work projects. 60 Five centers
developed garden projects, which provided a
supply of fresh vegetables and fruits. However,
the Transient Service was always careful to
preserve good community relations by ensuring that local produce was purchased for its
clients. Transients who, after social investigation, were permitted to do their own cooking
became eligible for surplus commodities issued
through the Surplus Products Division of the
KERC. Those housed in camps were communally fed. 6l
An attempt to combine leisure activities
with work relief can be seen in the establishment of five machine-sewing rooms in the
family treatment centers where, under the
direction of the local sewing project leadership,
women who could not sew were taught, and
those who could were given the opportunity
to use their skills for the benefit of their families. For example, mothers were encouraged to
make clothing for their school-age children. 62
Experience had shown that some clients would
send donated clothing to relatives who were
in desperate circumstances; others would sell
what they had been given and expect to be
reissued with more. Family-made garments,
perhaps because of a sense of ownership, were
treated differently.

255

Nor was the education of the young neglected. Children from the family treatment
centers attended school along with the offspring
of neighboring residents, which was seen as an
important bonding element in their new relationship with the community. Their presence
was perfectly acceptable to the boards of education in all three towns. This harmony relied
on a combination of Kansas law that obliged
all children residing in the state for more than
thirty days to attend school and the fact that
good relations between the centers and their
neighbors had been established at an early stage.
Even young men who were in congregate care
were able to use community education facilities.
A few were fortunate enough to be awarded
scholarships that enabled them to attend high
school, grade school, or even business school.
Suitable scholars were given direct relief.63
Work camps also provided a public service in accepting parolees from the State
Penitentiary and the Boys' Industrial School.
Prisoners eligible for parole who had been
transients at the time of their arrest but who
had neither legal settlement in Kansas, nor
relatives living in the state, nor the promise of a
job, could not be paroled. An arrangement was
made with the Parole Board for the Transient
Service to admit to one of its camps men who
they judged had a good chance of adjustment to
civilian life given the appropriate support. The
camps were seen as the ideal halfway house
for those due for release from prison but who
could not be legally paroled. Thus, in February
1934, the Transient Service accepted sixteen
males who had been paroled from Leavenworth
prison. Very few men were involved in this
experiment, which in any case lasted for such
a short period that it is not possible to make a
definitive evaluation of it, but it provides an
example of the Transient Service cooperating
with other state bodies and demonstrating a
willingness to open its facilities to a potentially
troublesome group that it could have ignored.
Conviviality was not always evident in the
relations between local relief officials and New
Dealers in Washington. To the intense irritation of Washington-based officials, the burial
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of nonresidents was a subject of continuous
bickering between the Transient Service and
county relief committees. When a transient
died who had no next-oF-kin to take care of
the funeral expenses, the charge of burial
fell upon the local relief administration. This
aroused great resentment on the part of the
relief authorities, who protested that because
they had not encouraged transients to come
to their county centers, they saw no reason
why the financial responsibility for interment
should be theirs. The complaints, which were
typically couched in pompous and indignant
language, were contemptuously dismissed by
Washington officials whose view was that, as
the federal government had given substantial
assistance to all counties through various New
Deal programs, the attempt of county commissioners to avoid their rightful responsibilities
over such small sums was shameful. 64
THE CLOSURE OF THE TRANSIENT SERVICE

During 1935 Congress approved a radical
reappraisal of the nation's welfare program.
Following a major reorganization of priorities,
the federal government decided to end its commitment to emergency relief and to disband the
FERA. Since unemployment was a national
problem, Washington declared its intention to
take responsibility for the nation's employable
persons in need of jobs. A new agency, the
Works Progress Administration (WPA), was
created to provide suitable work relief for needy
household heads who fell into this category.65
In other words, Washington made a clear distinction between those capable of work and
those who, for various reasons, could not be
employed. These unemployables became the
responsibility of the states or counties where
they had residence. Emergency federal relief
grants to the states were terminated, and as a
result, the funding for the transient program
disappeared. The federal plan was that from
late 1935, able-bodied transients in need would
become eligible for relief work from the newly
formed WPA, while the care of needy transient
unemployables would be assumed by the county

in which they resided, or more accurately
the one in which they had legal settlement.
Although the transient camps were popular
with both Kansas officials and the public, in
the eyes of senior Washington officials they
were unacceptable because they inevitably led
to segregation. In Harry Hopkins's own words:
"[Tjransient camps under the WPA came to an
end because of the strong conviction that their
psychology was not consistent with the aims
of the work program. The final victory for the
transient is only won when, working side by
side with the local man, he is known simply as
a good workman worthy of his hire."66
The realization that once the program was
wound up some transients would gain legal settlement and become Kansas residents attracted
a hostile reaction. The Hutchinson News
reported that Ford, Reno, and Shawnee county
commissioners had declared that they had "no
intention of supporting the federal cast-offs."67
Ford county commissioner A. P. Henthorn
was quoted in the Norton Telegram as saying,
"[W]e have too many local people in need to
spend any county money on transients.,,68 The
prospect of travelers working on relief projects
alongside residents of long standing was not
one that many communities relished. However,
although residence was not supposed to affect
WPA eligibility, in fact it did once the period of
transition from the transient service had been
completed. It was not sufficient to be unemployed to become eligible for WPA employment. Successful applicants had to be both
jobless and certified in need of relief after a full
investigation by a social worker. It was easy for
local officials to make life difficult for migrants
by refusing to accept certifications of relief
eligibility made elsewhere and insisting on a
new, and naturally lengthy, investigation. Even
more significant was the requirement that for
WPA certification, applicants had to be eligible
for relief. But to become eligible all applicants
had to live in a Kansas county continuously for
one year. Only then would the state's residence
requirements be met. 69 Moreover, WPA projects had to be supported by substantial contributions (usually 25 percent of the cost) from
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sponsors, who were usually the counties. Little
wonder that under these circumstances taxpayers believed that locals should be given priority for WPA work. Outsiders faced a further
handicap. Federal funding was never sufficient
to provide work for more than approximately
40 percent of the men and women eligible
for WPA jobs. The heads of transient families, followed by single transients, were at the
very bottom of the list of those considered for
scarce WPA employment. Outsiders were at
the mercy of county relief administrations or
the goodwill of private charities. County and
charitable relief was always less generous than
federal assistance, and was usually given in
kind rather than cash.
The liquidation of the Kansas Transient
Service began on September 20, 1935, when,
as the following figures show, the demands for
its services were still buoyant. During 1935 a
monthly average of 1,743 families (comprising
6,106 individuals) and 8,730 unattached nonresidents were assisted; $219,356 was paid in
cash wages and the value of relief in kind was
calculated at $402,202. One measure of how
generously transients were treated was that
some were able to start small savings accounts,
which ultimately facilitated a move to private
employment and personal budget management.7° However, once the registration of new
transients ceased, the state organization had
to be run down, but at a speed consistent with
the need to offer aid for those still legitimately
under the service's care. Families became cash
relief clients, each receiving a weekly check to
cover their needs. Those heads of families who
were fit for work were, in theory, available for
assignment to the WPA on the same basis as
residents; by the beginning of 1936, 70 percent
had been placed, though it is important to note
that most of the transients who were engaged
by the WPA lived and worked in camps. In
other words, they were retained to work on
projects that had been underway for some
time and whose distant location lessened the
competition from the local unemployed. Some
transient family heads were unable to work
because of old age, sickness, or injury. And
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some mothers who headed households were
unavailable for full-time employment because
of the demands of their children. These clients
ultimately became a county responsibility.
An extra effort was made to return transients who had a legal settlement outside
Kansas; during 1935, 364 families, 38 men, and
69 women and girls who fell into this category
were removed. On the other hand, in October
1935, 278 families who had gained legal settlement by living in a Kansas county continuously
for at least one year became the responsibility
of their new county, which received a grant of
funds toward their care. During each subsequent month, families were transferred to the
counties as soon as they had acquired settlement. However, as late as December 31, 656
families still remained the responsibility of
the Transient Service in the treatment centers
and thirty-one in the counties. All the family
treatment centers were closed on February 1,
1936, but the Transient Service continued to
fund the 230 remaining families until they had
acquired legal settlement. By September, all
were under the care of county organizations.7 1
Single men were dealt with in a different
manner. All the unemployables, about seventy
in number and mostly aged, were brought to
the Topeka center. They were, of course, not
eligible for WPA work and would eventually
become a county charge, after the exhaustion
of the final grant that accompanied them. All
the employables were transferred to the camps,
where work continued on water conservation
and other related schemes. In mid-1935 the
work on the Dodge City Transient Camp was
completed and in the fall the men were moved
to Wabaunsee. The Sedan project was also
finished and the men moved briefly to Howard
and then on to Wabaunsee. In November, the
WPA approved the continuation of the projects
at Gardener, Wabaunsee, and Howard, thus
enabling the men already working on them to
prolong their employment. However, once these
projects were competed, the men working on
them became a county responsibility.
A plea that the transient hospital in
Topeka should continue as an infirmary with
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a responsibility for camp residents was rejected,
so a decision had to be made about the future
of hospital patients, many of whom either
had, or would shortly gain, legal settlement
on Shawnee County. As the county poor farm
was full to capacity, a large mobile building was
moved from a transient camp to the poor farm
and transformed into a hospital. On January
23, 1936, the remaining eight patients were
transferred to it from the Topeka hospital,
which was then closed. Between December
1933 and the end of 1935, $31,894 was spent on
the Topeka hospital and 519 hospital clients
were admitted to it. A large but unrecorded
number of outpatients were also treated over
this two-year period. n The figures suggest that
there was a continuing demand for this hospital service.
AN EVALUATION

At an early stage the Kansas Transient
Service became one of the most highly regarded
in the country. In 1934, T. J. Edmonds, an FERA
field supervisor and an experienced observer of
state relief programs, gave his seal of approval by
commenting to Harry Hopkins, "[TJhis Kansas
set-up looks awfully good to me.'>?} These observations are consistent with other comments
from Edmonds and those of fellow field supervisors who were very impressed with the way in
which Kansas organized its relief for the welfare
of residents and nonresidents under the FERA
and the CWA,74 The emphasis on stabilizing
clients, the appointment of highly qualified staff,
and the imposition of a first-rate administrative
structure combined to provide a highly efficient
system of care. Unfortunately, even with such a
praiseworthy program, which was meticulous in
its recordkeeping, it is difficult to calculate just
how many transients were actually stabilized.
One can, however, appreciate some of the formidable problems facing caseworkers who tried
to implement this ambitious plan.
The fact that that many families and unattached individuals firmly resisted plans to stabilize them presented social workers with a serious
problem. Some migrants used the strategy of

applying for assistance at a reference center too
late in the day to either be assigned work or be
sent to a treatment center. They would be given
supper, shelter for the night, and breakfast next
morning, but despite promising to liaise with a
caseworker, they just continued their journey,75
A report on the operation of ten of the twelve
treatment centers during the period January 1
to December 21, 1934, which shows the average
length of stay of transient families, is revealing.
In the first place it is clear that there were great
variations in the average length of stay. In five of
the centers the percentage of clients staying for
less than two days was 58, 90, 67, 68, and 77. Even
in the treatment centers, a very high proportion
of clients were short-term visitors and therefore could not be candidates for stabilization.
Most long-term residents were housed at the
Wabaunsee and Gardner camps, where 53 and
48 percent of clients, respectively, remained for
longer than one month. In contrast, the family
treatment centers had a very rapid turnover of
clients, with only a small proportion remaining
for longer than four days,76 The conclusion must
be that the majority of transients did not stay
long enough for the stabilization process to be
effective, except where the service was successful in persuading clients to permanently return
to their place of legal settlement. However, it is
impossible to tell what proportion of families
and single individuals who returned home actually stayed there. Nor is it possible to judge the
success of a planned migration where Kansas
was merely a stopping off point. Transient
Service officials advised travelers on their route
and told them where help was available, but
there is no information on whether they reached
their desired destination or whether stable self
sufficiency was the outcome of their journey.
Dedicated Kansas officials worked hard to
provide a first-rate service for families on the
move. These social workers were not naive.
They were fully aware that the structure they
had created could be, and was, abused. The
"gasoline group," for example, always claimed
to have no resources; they demanded gas and
groceries but refused to cooperate in any stabilization plans. 77 Kansas was so well endowed

RELIEF FOR WANDERERS

with reference centers-one in each of the
105 counties-that the service was ripe for
exploitation. As the frustrated state director
of Transient Services wrote, an increasing
number of clients believed that Kansas "is the
land where the coffee tree grows and the sandwiches hang from the twigs."78 He reported
that men of all ages neglected to report to
caseworkers and would only travel to treatment
centers if the subsidized ride took them in the
direction they wanted to go. Even then they did
not turn up in the centers.
It was natural that officials, who were trying
to administer a system designed to reduce
transiency, resented the behavior of those
who seemed determined to undermine their
efforts. They suspected that the program was
actually encouraging government sponsored
panhandling.79 During May 1934, for example,
there seemed clear evidence that families were
leaving their home states in order to take
advantage of the Kansas Transient Service. 80
State officials claimed that migrants traveled to
Kansas because they were convinced that the
transient relief they would receive was far superior to the assistance that they could expect at
home. Kansas investigators believed that the
complaints of miserly relief assistance in some
other states had substance. But a contributory
factor could have been that the shame attached
to relief, which made an application for assistance intolerable at home, became bearable
where anonymity was likely.
For whatever reason, an economy drive was
instituted in December 1934, and clients who
had settlement elsewhere but had refused to
return were allocated budgets that were the
minimum they could have expected in their
place of legal settlement. 8l However, even this
draconian experiment, which was not consistent with the spirit of the Transient Service,
did not lead to the anticipated exodus. Kansas
officials found that relief administrations in
other states were sometimes reluctant to accept
returnees, even though they were legally
responsible for them. Moreover, families who
did return often found their relief so utterly
miserly, or its delivery so long delayed, that they
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had no incentive to stay but every incentive to
lose legal settlement so that they would qualify
for transient relief in Kansas. Repeated experiences confirmed the suspicion that the high
quality of service offered in Kansas contributed
to the movement of many clients who were
naturally desperate to escape abject misery, as
well as those less driven by abject poverty, who
were prepared to stay in "Uncle Sam's Hotels,"
as the increasing number of conservative critics called them, but were determined to resist
all attempts at stabilization.
Another problem that confronted both
caseworkers and their clients was the lack
of suitable work relief projects. All federally
funded work relief was limited to activities that
did not compete with private industry, which is
why there was a great concentration on public
construction. In a situation where there was a
shortage of work relief for both resident and
transient unemployed, locals bitterly resented
the competition from outsiders. This was especially true after the termination of the CWA
program in March 1934. Many of the jobless
who had been employed by the CWA, which
did not insist on an assessment by social workers to establish need as a prerequisite, were not
eligible for work relief under the FERA, which
did. The resulting tension often led to a lack of
cooperation between the transient service and
county relief organizations as the latter held
firmly to the view that outsiders should only be
allocated scarce relief jobs once local demand
had been fully satisfied. Many locals believed
that as transients received bed and board, they
already had a better deal than residents, and
that this injustice would be compounded if
they also pushed to the front of the line waiting for work relief. 82 The fortunate employed
used their labor organizations to object to
the employment of transients, whom they
suspected of not only taking away jobs from
their unemployed union work mates, but also of
giving employers the incentive to cut wages. 83
It is easy to understand why officials favored
camps for transients. They were distant from
concentrations of unemployment, and that
distance provided insulation against attack by
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organized labor. Moreover, within each camp
there was a full range of tasks to be performed
and therefore the skills of clients at all levels
could be usefully employed. The electrician,
the mason, the plumber, and the laborer not
only found their metier; there was also an
opportunity to teach men new skills. The
drawback was that work relief was supposed to
be an important element in a stabilization program that required integration in the community. The community spirit, however, seems to
have been easier to achieve with families than
with single men, though perhaps in the camps,
with their relatively long stay, the residents had
the compensation of achieving a greater sense
of camaraderie.
Even for families who were prepared to work
out a plan with caseworkers, stabilization posed
serious difficulties. Consider, for example,
those clients who came from the backwoods of
Missouri or Arkansas where they had endured
a miserable life as tenant farmers. Perpetually
in debt even though every member of the
family worked, now broken by drought, poor
health, and starvation levels of relief, they did
not want to return to their former communities. Kansas social workers felt that it would be
cruel to send seriously disadvantaged people
back to a perpetually depressing lifestyle, but
they were acutely aware that the transition to
an unfamiliar urban life for poverty-stricken
rural transients would also pose formidable
problems. 84 While the niceties of this dilemma
were debated, rural clients who enjoyed the
treatment centers were quick to encourage
their relatives to join them, thus adding to the
migration that the transient service was trying
to contain. Meticulous casework was essential
with poor rural families, many of whom would
have benefited more from subsistence homesteads than from urban work relief.
With the demise of the Transient Service,
accurate nationwide data on migration were no
longer available. To get some indication of the
extent of this ongoing problem, the U.S. Senate
asked the states to gather information on
transients for the month ofJune 1936. To meet
with this request, administrators in eighty-six

Kansas counties, the Salvation Army, and all
private welfare agencies provided information
on travelers, or at least those travelers who had
requested assistance. Though not as robust as
the data collected by the Transient Service,
where the possibility of double counting was
remote, it seems that for the month in question, 271 families, most accompanied by children, sought help from the counties. Of those,
149 were successful in gaining assistance at a
cost of only $515.15, of which less than half
was allocated for food. Either the counties had
become extremely parsimonious or the needs
of these applicants were not very pressing. The
former seems the more convincing explanation. The counties also assisted 299 unattached
males, but most of their expenses were to cover
emergency medical care and hospitalization. 85
Migrants continued to flow into Kansas after
the transient program was discontinued, but
they were at the mercy of a county relief system
that never considered them a high priority, or
they were reliant upon the generosity of private
charities.
Virtually all states were conscious of the
presence of migrants but few considered that
their out-migration had contributed to the
national problem. In spite of the influx of transients, and a surplus of births over deaths, the
total population of Kansas declined by approximately eighty thousand persons between 1930
and 1940, the first decline since census records
began. In particular the state lost a disproportionate number of males and also young people,
including families with children. During
this period the state's farm population fell by
approximately one hundred thousand, but
those being driven from the family farm would
find relatively few economic opportunities in
urban Kansas. Many had to look out of state if
they were to secure a future for themselves and
their families. 86 An analysis of all the factors
influencing the powerful push and pull factors,
which strongly influenced so many potentially
restless people throughout the 1930s, is beyond
the scope of this paper. 87 Nor, indeed, can we
answer that very pertinent question, namely,
why others similarly affected by economic
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misfortune opted to stay put. What is certain is
that many of those who chose to move would
need some targeted assistance along the way.
A representative sample of 5,489 interstate
migrant families selected from those who were
receiving care in transient bureaus during the
summer of 1935 provides an fascinating insight
into the causes and the results of population
movement. Although the sample is weighted
toward urban families, as the bureaus were
located in cities, and those who were least
equipped to move on to a new destination,
this statistical exercise is of value if the results
are properly interpreted. 88 Of 1,091 families in
this sample who had migrated from Kansas,
33 percent had done so because of unemployment, 17 percent because of farm failure, while
ill health had persuaded 13 percent to move.
In other words, the loss of a job was a more
significant reason for migration than farm misfortune. The 1,091 families originating from
Kansas were found in the transient bureaus of
thirty-four states, but the most significant locations were Colorado (335), California (193),
and Missouri (149). It should be pointed out
that Kansas gained more families than were
lost, as the state's transient bureaus housed
1,368 out-of-state families. Of these, the most
significant sources were Arkansas with 124
families, Missouri with 357, Oklahoma with
343, and Texas with 93. These figures show
that most family migration was over relatively
short distances. 89 Unfortunately, the survey did
not consider single migrants, whose profile was
probably very different.
The federal government provided Kansas
with $2.1 million to finance the Transient
Relief program, which was a relatively large
sum. Funding for the other FERA Special
Emergency Relief Programs to March 1937 was
as follows: Rural Rehabilitation, $1.3 million;
College Student Aid, $334,000; and Emergency
Education, $265,000Yo There can be no doubt
that the Transient Service in Kansas gave
valuable help to needy people who otherwise
would have received little or no assistance at
a time when adverse economic circumstances
acted as a force for mobility. Indeed, during
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the two years of its operation, the national
transient program assisted approximately two
hundred thousand families containing about
seven hundred thousand persons. The figures
show that there was a sizeable constituency
of needy nonresident families and individuals
who could benefit from the professional assistance offered by social workers in the struggle
to stabilize their lives. It is hard to be fiercely
critical of a well-intentioned program that
had such a short life that its administrators
had little opportunity to learn from mistakes.
Kansas did provide a highly effective service
for those who were prepared to avail themselves fully of it. A settled existence in Kansas,
a return to their state of origin, or a planned
onward migration was a favorable outcome for
some families. However, it is evident that the
majority of travelers, though it is not possible
to say exactly how many, were prepared to use
the Transient Service as a form of "passing on."
There is also some evidence that the quality of
service offered in Kansas acted as a magnet and
attracted the needy.
With the demise of the FERA, federal assistance for needy migrants came to a halt and
the responsibility for assistance was passed to
the counties. It is not surprising that strangers
were always a low priority in the distribution
of welfare resources. As WPA funding was
able to accommodate only about 40 percent of
those eligible for relief employment, outsiders
faced a considerable competitive disadvantage.
Moreover, strict settlement rules ensured that
if the residence requirements were not met,
charitable handouts were all that transients
could legitimately expect. Economically distressed migrants bore the heaviest cost of the
transfer from the FERA to the WPA.91 From
late 1935, indigent migrants were forced to turn
once again to private relief agencies, or to the
counties, or when all else failed, to begging.
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